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 As the US completes its military withdrawal from Iraq, the Obama 
Administration’s stated policy goals are to promote security, stability and prosperity in 
Iraq, help it emerge as a force for stability and moderation in the region, transition 
responsibility for security to the Iraqis and cultivate an enduring relationship with Iraq 
based on mutual interests and respect.  However, almost all of these goals are 
complicated by the fact that around 3.5 million Iraqis are still displaced, around 2 million 
internally and the rest in neighboring countries.  The US has recognized that the 
displacement of Iraqis has a direct impact on its goals in Iraq, but, as this study 
demonstrates, its response to the displacement problem suggests that it has either not 
grasped, or is unwilling to acknowledge, the scale of the problem. This response has been 
determined primarily by politics and security concerns, and while the US has helped 
provide much needed humanitarian relief to displaced Iraqis, it has treated their 
displacement as a purely humanitarian problem while neglecting its other aspects.  An 
overemphasis on the humanitarian aspects of displacement has prevented the US from 
developing a more comprehensive response that could both help it achieve its goals in 
Iraq and add to the likelihood that Iraq will eventually emerge as a prosperous stable 
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 As the US completes its military withdrawal from Iraq, the Obama 
Administration’s stated policy goals are to promote security, stability and prosperity in 
Iraq, help it emerge as a force for stability and moderation in the region, transition 
responsibility for security to the Iraqis and cultivate an enduring relationship with Iraq 
based on mutual interests and respect.1  However, almost all of these goals are 
complicated by the mass displacement of Iraqis.  In its latest displacement figures for Iraq 
(February 2011), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) lists its 
total “population of concern” as 3,565,375.  This number includes refugees—those Iraqis 
who have the fled the country—as well as internally displaced people (IDPs).2  Although 
security has improved significantly since Iraqis began fleeing their homes in the 
thousands in mid-2006, this improvement has not been reflected by any marked decrease 
in the total number of displaced Iraqis.  While the numbers of newly displaced are low, so 
are the numbers of returnees because most displaced Iraqis are not yet convinced that 
their country is safe enough for them to return.3  Moreover, it is not uncommon for those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James F. Jeffrey, “The Challenging Transition to a Civilian Mission,” Statement to the Senate 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., February 1, 2011, www.state.gov.     
2 UNHCR, Country Operations Profile: Iraq, April 2011, www.unhcr.org.   
3 UNHCR, Country Operations Profile: Iraq; Joseph Sassoon, The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis 
in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 158.	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who do return soon to leave again in order to escape the continuing violence, seek 
employment opportunities outside Iraq, or to find new homes because theirs have been 
occupied or destroyed during their absence.4 
 The displacement of almost 4 million Iraqis has resulted mainly from the sectarian 
violence set off by the bombing of the al-‘Askariyya mosque in February 2006, but the 
Iraqi government’s inability to deliver basic services and the lack of economic 
opportunities have also contributed.   Most Iraqi refugees are living in Jordan and Syria, 
which do not grant them “official” refugee status, resulting in populations of what 
Géraldine Chatelard has called “invisible migrants” because they can neither return to 
Iraq nor integrate into the local populations.5  While most Iraqis are not allowed to work 
in Jordan and Syria, they can receive healthcare in public clinics and their children can 
attend public schools, with the result that their presence has put severe burdens on the 
social services of these countries.  They have also contributed to water shortages and are 
perceived as being the cause of price increases, resulting in resentment among the local 
populations and creating the potential for instability.6 On the other hand, despite 
expectations to the contrary, Iraqi refugees have not exported their country’s sectarian 
violence,7 although displacement can reinforce sectarian identities, as Iraqi refugees find 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 John Leland, “Iraq’s Troubles Drive out Refugees Who Came Back,” The New York Times, Nov. 
26, 2010; Sassoon, 158-160.  
5 Géraldine Chatelard, Jordan as a Transit Country: Semi-Protectionist Immigration Policies and 
their Effects on Iraqi Forced Migrants, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European 
University Institute, Working Paper no. 61, August 2002, 6. 
6 International Crisis Group (ICG), Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and 
Lebanon, Middle East Report no. 77, July 10, 2008, 12-3, 23-4; Sassoon, 46-51, 75-8.  Despite the 
perception among host populations that Iraqis exacerbate existing economic problems, Sassoon has shown 
that at least in Jordan the net economic impact of the influx of Iraqis has been positive.   
7 ICG, 6; Reinoud Leenders, “Getting the ‘Ladder of Options’ Right—The Illusive and Real 
Security Fallout of the Iraq Refugee Crisis,” Middle East Institute, Sept. 2010.  
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support among members of their own sect, and tend to live in sectarian communities,8 
creating fears among host governments that they will eventually enflame sectarian 
tensions.9  Internal displacement has had similar destabilizing effects on Iraq,10 which can 
hardly emerge as a force for stability and moderation in the region when significant 
numbers of its population remain displaced. 
 Displacement also hinders the process of economic development in Iraq.  
Significant numbers of its professional class have fled the country, resulting in a brain 
drain, which complicates the task of growing Iraq’s economy.  Reconstruction projects 
suffer from a lack of skilled workers and the quality of higher education and healthcare 
has decreased in part because so many academics and doctors have fled the country.  
Because Iraqi universities lack both the teachers and the resources to train new 
professionals properly, the future graduates of these universities are unlikely to have the 
qualifications necessary to fill the gaps left by the flight of Iraq’s middle class.11  
Although the Obama Administration’s official policy statements on Iraq emphasize 
promoting stability and prosperity rather than democracy, one hopes that it is also 
committed to help strengthen Iraq’s democratic institutions, but this, too, is complicated 
by the absence of a numerically significant middle class.  Promoting prosperity and 
protecting democracy both depend at least in part on creating incentives for Iraqi refugees 
to return.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 ICG, 5-6, Chatelard, 6.	  	  	  
9 ICG, 11. 
10 Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant, Dalia Dassa Kaye, The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq 
on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations, Occasional Paper, Rand: National Defense Institute, 
2010, 12. 
11 Sassoon, 129-150.	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If the US hopes to cultivate an enduring relationship based on mutual interests 
and respect with a democratic Iraq, it cannot ignore the humanitarian aspects of 
displacement either.  Perceived indifference to the plight of Iraqi refugees would add to 
the resentment many Iraqis already feel toward the US and thus further complicate their 
country’s relations with it.12 
Because displacement has a direct impact on America’s stated goals in Iraq, the 
US has a clear interest in seeing the problem resolved, and it has recognized, albeit 
reluctantly and belatedly, that the displacement of Iraqis is not a problem it can ignore.  
Its response, however, suggests that the US has either not grasped, or is unwilling to 
acknowledge, the scale of the problem. 
 
 
     
US Policy Toward Displaced Populations 
 
 The Obama Administration’s report on proposed refugee admissions for fiscal 
year 2011, which discusses refugee policy in addition to proposing refugee admissions, 
emphasizes that “the United States actively supports efforts to provide protection, 
assistance and durable solutions to refugees, as these measures meet both our 
humanitarian objectives and our foreign policy and national security interests.”13  Durable 
solutions include three basic options: voluntary repatriation, local integration in countries 
of asylum, and third-country resettlement.  The international community’s preferred 
solution is voluntary repatriation, but when this is not possible, local integration is the 
next best option.  Third-country resettlement is considered only when the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Oliker, et al., 13. 
13 US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, US Department of Health and 
Human Services, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2011, Oct. 2010, 1. 
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alternatives are not viable.  The US assists in repatriation and local integration by funding 
UNHCR and NGOs that provide relief to displaced populations, and it uses the US 
Refugee Assistance Program (USRAP) to help those with no other options to resettle in 
the US.14 
 The US thus recognizes that assisting displaced populations serves its interests, 
and although official policy statements regarding refugees and IDPs emphasize 
humanitarian goals, it is clear that the US response to displacement is driven primarily by 
politics.  The acknowledgement that helping displaced populations meets foreign policy 
interests provides some indication of the politics informing US refugee policy.  During 
the Cold War, refugee assistance was much more overtly political, as the US and other 
Western powers tended to use the international refugee protection regime as a pawn in 
their ideological struggle with the Soviet Union and with Communism in general.  In its 
effort to demonstrate the superiority of capitalism and liberal democracy, the US was 
much more willing to resettle refugees from Communist regimes than from other parts of 
the world.15  Details about the current politics surrounding US refugee policy can be 
gleaned from the lists of refugees categorized as “of special concern to the United 
States,” the only refugees eligible to apply for resettlement through USRAP.16  For 
example, Cuban asylum seekers have been eligible for such resettlement for several 
decades, whereas Iraqis did not appear as a priority in US policy documents until late 
2008, more than two years after the height of the sectarian violence that caused millions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., 1-2.	  
15 Gil Loescher, Alexander Betts, and James Milner, The United High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection into the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 14-46. 
16 Ibid., 1-2. 
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to flee their homes.17  While few would argue that the Castro regime respects human 
rights, it is undeniable that throughout 2006, Iraqis had a greater need for humanitarian 
assistance than Cubans.  However, it is also true that while the US was happy to draw 
attention to the failures of the Castro regime that might cause Cubans to seek asylum in 
the US, it was not so eager to acknowledge the same failures in Iraq. 
 As this study will demonstrate, the US response to the displacement of Iraqis 
since 2003 has been determined primarily by politics and security concerns.  In the first 
few months after Saddam Hussein was overthrown, Iraqis who had been displaced before 
2003 began returning, and the US was eager to draw attention to this fact because it was 
an indication that the US had created the necessary conditions for the voluntarily 
repatriation of Iraqi refugees, that Iraqis supported America’s vision for a new Iraq and 
that they had confidence in their country’s future.  As the situation in Iraq deteriorated 
and the trend of repatriations reversed, the US continued to insist that repatriation was 
possible.  It began acknowledging that repatriations were now vastly outnumbered by 
new displacements only when it became more politically damaging to ignore the problem 
than to acknowledge it. 
 Responding to the problem involved recognizing that the US had a special 
obligation to assist the displaced Iraqis who had became targets of violence because they 
had worked with or helped the US in some way.  The obvious solution was resettlement 
in the US, but this process was complicated by the new immigration rules implemented 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  American’s legitimate security concerns thus made it 
difficult for it to fulfill its moral obligation toward displaced Iraqis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, US Department of Health and 
Human Services, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2011, Oct. 2008, 11.  For a comparison, 
see the reports from 2003 to 2007.	  
7	  
	  
 When the US finally acknowledged the severity of the displacement problem, it 
responded by providing humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees and IDPs.  However, it 
has overemphasized the humanitarian dimensions of the problem while neglecting its 
other aspects.  Granted, the problem is extremely complex, and it is not entirely clear how 
much more the US could actually do to help resolve it, but, as the authors of a Rand 
Corporation study on the impact of the military drawdown have argued, recognizing it as 







 A variety of terms are used to describe displaced populations, and because they 
are often used interchangeably, they can create confusion.  The terms most relevant to 
this study are “refugee,” “asylum-seeker” and “internally-displaced people.”  The main 
difference is that while refugees and asylum-seekers have crossed international borders, 
internally-displaced people have not.  As defined by the 1951 Convention on the Status 
of Refugees, a refugee is one who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."19  An asylum-seeker has 
fled his or her home country and is awaiting official recognition of refugee status.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant, Dalia Dassa Kaye, The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq 
on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations: Analysis and Recommendations, Rand: National Defense 
Institute, 2010, 20.	  
19 UNHCR, “Refugees,” 2001-2011, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html. 
20 UNHCR, “Asylum-Seekers,” 2001-2011, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html.  
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Internally-displaced people (IDPs) have fled their homes to escape violence or 
persecution but have not crossed an international border.21  While both refugees and 
asylum-seekers are eligible for international protection, IDPs are still legally under the 







 The published work on the displacement of Iraqis since 2003 focuses mainly on 
the humanitarian concerns surrounding the displaced, and their impact on Iraq and its 
neighbors. While most of these works criticize the US response to displacement, none 
contains a comprehensive analysis of the development of this response since 2003. 
To date, only one book has been published on the displacement of Iraqis since 
2003, Sassoon’s The Iraqi Refugees, which contains a short section on the U.S. response, 
arguing that the US was slow to acknowledge the problem because “admitting that these 
people were fleeing because of the total chaos would be to admit failure of the US policy 
in Iraq.”23  Sassoon notes that another factor affecting this policy was the general belief 
that displacement was not a crisis and was not triggered by the actions of the US.  
American avoidance of the issue was particularly harmful for those Iraqis who had 
worked for the US and then had to flee their homes because they were accused of 
colluding with the enemy.24  Sassoon briefly traces the evolution of the US response, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 UNHCR, “Internally-Displaced People,” 2001-2011, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html.  
22 UNHCR, “Internally-Displaced People.”	  
23 Sassoon, 110. 
24 Sassoon, 112. 
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noting that after pressure from Congress, the media and the international community, the 
Bush Administration gradually came to acknowledge the extent of the displacement 
problem, allocated more funds to NGOs and international organizations working to assist 
refugees and IDPs, and began admitting more Iraqis into the US.25 
While arguing that the US response has been inadequate, Chantal Berman 
acknowledges that it has been easier for displaced Iraqis to resettle in the US since 2007 
as a result of the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program created for displaced Iraqis who 
have worked for the US and the new P2 category of visas designed for Iraqis of “special 
humanitarian concern.”  However, she adds that only a small percentage of displaced 
Iraqis qualify for these special visas.26  Like Sassoon, Elizabeth Ferris draws attention to 
America’s initial reluctance to acknowledge the problem and also highlights the ways in 
which the US has assisted displaced Iraqis since 2007.27  
The Brookings Institution, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis 
Group have all published studies based on extensive field work among displaced Iraqis, 
which highlight the humanitarian concerns surrounding displacement and its impact on 
Iraq and its neighbors while also criticizing the US response to displacement.28  Their 
criticisms echo those made by Sassoon, Berman, and Ferris, and they note that while its 
response is still inadequate, the US has belatedly recognized the problem and devoted 
more resources to assisting displaced Iraqis.  Harriet Dodd connects American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Sassoon, 110-112. 
26 Chantal Berman, “An Uncommon Burden: Aid, Resettlement, and Refugee Policy in Syria,” 
Middle East Institute, Dec. 2010, 12-3. 
27 Elizabeth Ferris, The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq, The Brookings 
Institution, Aug. 2008, 17-21.	  
28 Ashraf al-Khalidi, Sophia Hoffman and Victor Tanner, Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian Arab 
Republic: A Field-Based Snapshot, The Brookings Institute, June 2007, www.brookings.edu; Human 
Rights Watch, The Silent Treatment: Fleeing Iraq, Surviving in Jordan, 18/10(E), (November 2006); ICG. 
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recognition of the problem with the 2006 mid-term elections, noting that the war in Iraq 
was central to this election and that “the exposure of the size of the [displacement] 
problem forced the Administration to admit to an increasingly hostile public at home that 
their war was affecting innocent lives in ways that were deeply unpopular.”29   
A 2010 Rand Corporation study sponsored by the Secretary of Defense examines 
the impact of the military drawdown on displaced and other vulnerable populations.  The 
study notes that the US has recognized that as it withdraws troops from Iraq its capacity 
to assist displaced Iraqis who have worked for the US will decrease.  It is thus developing 
a database of Iraqis eligible for resettlement in the US to simplify the application 
process.30  The study also emphasizes that long-term displacement is detrimental to U.S. 
interests in Iraq and the region as a whole because it creates security concerns, 
contributes to instability, hinders economic development and raises serious humanitarian 
concerns.31    
 In a 2010 study on the US response to internal displacement throughout the world, 
Roberta Cohen and Dawn Calabia identify improvements to this response over the past 
ten years as well as several perceived flaws, several of which apply equally to American 
policy toward the internal displacement of Iraqis.  While acknowledging that the US 
adopted a specific USAID policy for IDPs in 2004 and that the State Department’s 
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration now devotes more attention to IDPs, they  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Harriet Dodd, “Iraqi Refugees in Jordan: The Challenges of Providing Assistance in an Opaque 
Environment,” Middle East Institute, Dec. 2010. 
30 Oliker, et al., 6.  
31 Oliker, et al, 12-14.	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indicate that implementation of IDP policy is irregular, initiatives to assist IDPs are 
underfunded, and insufficient attention is paid to the reintegration of IDPs.32  
Without criticizing the US response directly, Géraldine Chatelard’s work on the 
regional effects of displacement reveals some of its perceived failures.  In several of her 
articles, she examines the ways in which displaced Iraqis use Jordan as a transit point for 
potential resettlement in the US and Europe and shows how displacement contributes to 
organized crime as Iraqis sometimes rely on human traffickers to cross borders and 
document forgers to acquire passports and other necessary papers.33  One reason Jordan 
has become a transit point is because of its policy toward displaced Iraqis, which allows 
them to stay while preventing them from integrating into Jordanian society.  Chatelard 
argues that the goal of this policy is to create “incentives to transit,” through which 
Jordan hopes to encourage the US and other countries to share the burden of hosting 
displaced Iraqis.  Her work thus contains the implied criticism that the US has placed an 
unfair burden on Jordan as a result of its inadequate response to the displacement of 
Iraqis and has encouraged it to adopt a policy that has potentially destabilizing effects. 
The three basic points that emerge from this literature review are that initially the 
US ignored the displacement problem, that its response has improved significantly since 
mid-2006 and that despite improvements, this response remains inadequate.  What is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Roberta Cohen and Dawn Calabia, “Improving the US Response to Internal Displacement: 
Recommendations to the Obama Administration and the Congress,” Brookings-Bern Project on Internal 
Displacement, June 2010. 
33 Incentives to Transit: Policy Responses to Influxes of Iraqi Forced Migrants in Jordan, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Working Paper, RSC no. 2002/50; 
Jordan as a Transit Country: Semi Protectionist Immigration Polices and Their Effects on Iraqi Forced 
Migrants, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Working Paper, no 
61, August 2002; “Iraqi Asylum Migrants in Jordan: Condition, Religious Networks and the Smuggling 
Process” in George Borjas and Jeff Crisp, eds., Poverty, International Migration and Asylum (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 341-370.	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missing is a detailed analysis of how the US response to the displacement of Iraqis has 






In order to trace the development of the US response to the displacement of Iraqis 
and show how it has changed over the course of the conflict in Iraq, this study begins in 
2003 and ends by examining the most recent documents and public statements released 
by the Obama Administration.  It is organized into three chapters, each of which 
discusses a particular period in the conflict.  The first chapter focuses on the first two 
years of the conflict (2003-2005), when newly displaced Iraqis were significantly 
outnumbered by returning refugees and IDPs.  The second chapter, which covers 2006-
2008, discusses the US response during the height of the displacement problem in mid-
2006 and traces it through the end of the Bush Administration.  The third chapter 











As Géraldine Chatelard has shown, displacement has been a part of Iraq’s social 
and political fabric since the establishment of the state in 1920, and the state itself has 
been responsible for much of this displacement.1  She argues that historically, 
“population displacements in Iraq were intrinsically linked to the creation of a nation 
state seeking to homogenize populations, assert sovereignty over territories contested by 
other nationalist claims, silence domestic political opposition, and perform population 
engineering as part of policies of modernization and development.”2  The most recent 
examples are Saddam Hussein’s policies of forced expulsion in northern and southern 
Iraq, which resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kurds and Shi‘is.  
However, as Chatelard acknowledges, other factors have also caused Iraqis to flee their 
homes, and under Saddam Hussein they included the devastation of two wars, increased 
authoritarianism, Iraq’s pariah status, its impoverishment after years of UN sanctions, the 
resulting decline in  healthcare and education systems, and a desire to seek greater 
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opportunities outside the country.3  In March 2003, when the US-led coalition invaded 
Iraq, an estimated 1 million Iraqis were already internally displaced4 and another 500,000 
were refugees.5 
 Despite expectations to the contrary, the war did not immediately result in 
significant numbers of new displacements.  According to UNHCR, it is more common 
for mass displacements to occur later in a conflict, sometimes even after the fighting has 
ended.  However, it may well have been that Iraqis simply felt safer at home.6  Ashraf al-
Khalidi and Victor Tanner note that another factor keeping Iraqis home was the new hope 
that they could rebuild their country and establish a more inclusive political system after 
the fall of Saddam Hussein. 7 Philip Marfleet illustrates this hope by drawing attention to 
what he refers to as “the creation of new forms of organization,” noting that by June 
2004, Iraqis had established 13 new  television stations, 74 radio stations and 150 
independent newspapers and magazines.  He also cites the widespread interest in the 
2005 parliamentary elections.8  Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and the sectarian conflict 
responsible for most of the violence that has come to characterize post-war Iraq had not 
yet emerged.9   
In the months directly after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq faced a different kind 
of displacement problem: determining how to accommodate the refugees and IDPs who 
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6 UNHCR, “UN Humanitarian Briefing on Iraq,” April 2, 2003. 
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Displacement in Iraq, The Brookings Institution, October 2006, 7. 
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9 Khalidi and Tanner, 7.	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had decided to return home. Immediately after the war began, Iraqi refugees began 
expressing a desire to go home.  Those who had been living in a Saudi refugee compound 
near the border with Iraq since 1991 told a reporter from the New York Times that the 
compound felt like a prison and that they longed to see their country again.  Some had 
born children in the compound and wanted them to see Iraq for the first time.10  This 
desire was shared by the hundreds of refugees who returned to Iraq from Iran throughout 
the second half of 200311 and even by those living in the much greater comfort of 
London.12  By May 2004, more than 6,000 displaced Iraqis had returned from Iran and 
almost 5,000 from Saudi Arabia.13 IDPs were also returning, and by March 2004, 60,000 
displaced Kurds had returned to Kirkuk.14  Although UNHCR had made preparations to 
assist Iraqis fleeing their country, neither it, nor other humanitarian organizations, nor the 
US was fully prepared to help with repatriation, although they were able to provide some 
assistance.15  As a result, by mid-2004, most of the returnees still had not been able to 
return to their homes, and many returned refugees had become IDPs.16  To complicate 
matters further, their return created tension and additional displacements as they 
struggled to recover their old homes from their new occupants.17  
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 By late 2004, significant numbers of Iraqis had been newly displaced.  In 
November 2004, the conflict between coalition forces and insurgents in Falluja led to the 
displacement of almost 200,000 Iraqis.  Sectarian tensions were also starting to surface, 
and Iraqis began fleeing mixed areas for ones where their own sects predominated.18  One 
indicator that sectarianism remained latent at the beginning of the war was the fact that 
only 4.5 percent of Iraqis questioned in a survey stated that religion should be a 
determining factor in choosing a political party.19  As conditions deteriorated, it emerged 
as a cause of violence, and thus a contributor to displacement.   
This deterioration was due in part to the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) 
dismantling of the remaining institutions of the state and its inability to fill their place 
quickly enough to ensure that Iraqis’ basic needs were met.  De-B‘athification and the 
disbanding of the Iraqi army rendered around 400,000 people jobless and left ministries 
without ministers and essential staff.  In 2004, the official unemployment rate was 48 
percent, but other estimates placed it closer to 70 percent.20  Families, and in some cases 
entire communities, were left without livelihoods.  Basic services, the judicial system and 
financial institutions were all essentially non-existent.21 
 As Iraqis became more desperate, kinship and sectarian ties became more 
important because they were the primary means through which Iraqis could obtain basic 
necessities.  Marfleet notes that most Iraqis were not innately hostile toward different 
sectarian groups, but as their survival came to depend more on ties with their own groups 
they became increasingly sectarian.  Within this atmosphere, the struggle for limited 
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resources resulted in sectarian violence,22 which then spawned more violence in the form 
of revenge killings.23  In March 2004, UNHCR highlighted the fact that Iraqis believed to 
be working or collaborating with the CPA had also become targets of violence.24 
 By the end of 2005, over 250,000 Iraqis were living as refugees, over 20,000 were 
seeking asylum and 1.2 million were displaced within Iraq.25  It is important to note that 
these figures include Iraqis displaced both before and after the 2003 war.  However, when 
compared with the figures from before the war and with the numbers of returnees, they 
provide some indication of how many Iraqis became displaced between 2003 and 2005.  
Before the war, 500,000 Iraqi refugees were registered with UNHCR, and by the end of 
2005, just over 300,000 had returned.26  The figures for 2005 thus suggest that at least 
50,000 Iraqis had become refugees since 2003.  In 2003, around 1 million were internally 
displaced, and by the end of 2005, just under 200,000 had returned,27 so the figures for 
2005 indicate that roughly 400,000 Iraqis had been internally displaced since 2003. 
 During the first few years of post-Saddam Iraq, the direct causes of displacement 
were increasing sectarian violence, conflicts between the coalition forces and the 
insurgency and violence against Iraqis perceived to be collaborating with the CPA.  Iraq’s 
inability to accommodate returning refugees contributed as well.  However, in a more 
general sense, displacement was the result of what Marfleet refers to as “cumulative 
causation.”  He explains this by noting that populations are initially very reluctant to flee, 
but when individuals begin to leave, a process is often set in motion that disrupts 
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community structures, compelling more and more people to leave until the integrity of 
the community is compromised, resulting in mass migration.28  While mass migration 
from Iraq had not yet begun by the end of 2005, the process had been set in motion.    
 
The Return of Displaced Iraqis as a Vote of Confidence  
in their Country’s Future 
 On March 19, 2003, when President Bush announced that the US had begun 
military operations against Iraq, he stated that the purpose of the war was “to disarm Iraq, 
free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”29  However, by the end of 
2004, when it was clear that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the US 
began placing more emphasis on freeing its people through the establishment of a stable 
democracy, and the return of displaced Iraqis was understood as being consistent with 
this goal.  In a speech at the end of 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
described the return of thousands of displaced Iraqis as a “vote of confidence in the future 
of the country.”30 
 It also fitted nicely with US policy toward displaced populations.  The State 
Department identifies the assistance of refugees worldwide as an important foreign policy 
goal and emphasizes that its “assistance is targeted to address immediate protection needs 
of refugees as well as to ensure that basic needs for water, sanitation, food, health care, 
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shelter and education are met.”31  Its preferred solution to displacement is voluntary 
repatriation, and this preference is shared by the international community.  In the early 
stages of the conflict in Iraq, when the numbers of returnees were far higher than those of 
the newly displaced, the US was in a position not only to make the plausible claim that it 
had created the necessary conditions for refugees and IDPs to return to Iraq but also to 
emphasize that their return was an indication that the US had been right to invade Iraq 
and that it was succeeding in its project to rebuild the country as a stable democracy.  In 
short, the return of displaced Iraqis was politically convenient for the US.  
The emphasis on voluntary repatriation is evident in the available documents on 
displacement from the postwar planning committees and the CPA.  These documents 
create the impression that although the planning committees anticipated the return of 
displaced Iraqis, the CPA was left to respond to the situation as it unfolded.  Three main 
entities had been responsible for postwar planning: the State Department’s Future of Iraq 
Project and two offices based in the Department of Defense—the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Office of Special Plans 
(OSP).  There was little or no coordination among the three groups or even between the 
two based in the Pentagon.  Jay Garner, the head of ORHA, claimed never to have seen 
any of the plans produced by OSP.32  The work of these three offices must be understood 
within the context of the bitter infighting between the State Department, which was very 
skeptical of the administration’s plans for post-war Iraq, and the Department of Defense, 
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which the Bush Administration gave its own planning offices to ensure that it had greater 
control over Iraq’s future.   
The Future of Iraq Project included a working group to discuss issues relating to 
returning refugees and IDPs.  The group held preliminary discussions resulting in a 
PowerPoint slide indicating that it must develop plans to address the humanitarian and 
legal issues surrounding the return of displaced Iraqis and that it must develop plans for 
determining citizenship and ownership of property, but the group never held a formal 
meeting. 33  Documents from ORHA and OSP remain classified, but Garner has stated 
that his team expected the war to result in new displacements and prepared accordingly.34  
It is unclear whether ORHA planned for the return of Iraqis displaced before 2003.  
According to Larry Bartlett, the CPA’s senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of 
Displacement and Migration, the State Department formed Disaster Assistance Response 
Teams (DART) almost a year before the war to begin planning for the return of displaced 
Iraqis.  The DART teams recognized the problems that might occur as Kurds returning to 
Kirkuk and its surrounding areas found their former homes occupied by Arabs brought in 
through Saddam’s Arabization campaign.  Bartlett claims that the US thus secured 
commitments from its Kurdish allies to prevent returning Kurds from displacing Arabs, 
and that the Kurdish leadership agreed to help returning Kurds seek restitution or 
compensation in “a uniform legal manner.”35  Bartlett revealed this information in an 
interview with David Romano, but documentation of the DARTs’ planning does not 
seem to be publicly available.  Moreover, the commitment from the Kurdish leadership 
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did not stop new displacements from occurring, as many Arabs fled out of fear that the 
returning Kurds would seek revenge, although in some cases they left because they 
recognized that they were occupying other people’s homes.36 
The CPA acknowledged the necessity of formalizing a process for resolving land 
disputes, and Paul Bremer, administrator of the CPA, issued two regulations regarding 
property claims.  The first, issued in June 2003, recognized “that large numbers of people 
from different ethnic and religious backgrounds in Iraq have been uprooted and forced to 
move from their properties to serve political objectives of the Ba‘thist regime” and that 
“pending the establishment of a means of fully resolving property-related claims by a 
future Iraqi government, certain of these claims may be amenable to voluntary 
reconciliation immediately, thereby avoiding further and instability and violence.”37  The 
regulation established the Iraqi Property Reconciliation Facility (IPRF) and tasked it with 
collecting property claims and resolving them quickly and judiciously.  The second 
regulation authorized Iraq’s Governing Council to establish the Iraq Property Claims 
Commission (IPCC) to perform the duties previously assigned to the IPRF, and the 
commission’s work has continued under the government of Iraq.38  This regulation also 
contained detailed guidelines for resolving property disputes, and it appears to have had 
some success, as roughly a third of the claims it has received have been resolved.39 
 A further indication of the CPA’s acknowledgement of the challenge presented by 
returning refugees and IDPs was the order Bremer signed in January 2004 establishing 
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the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM), which recognized “that the return, 
relocation and reintegration of refugees and internally placed persons (IDPs) is vital to 
Iraq’s social and political stability.”40  A CPA fact sheet published in May that year 
indicates that the MODM’s objectives were to “assist limited voluntary refugee returns to 
Iraq” and “create durable solutions for IDPs.”  The ministry’s accomplishments are listed 
as facilitating the return of over 11,000 refugees, and the challenges identified relate to 
Iraq’s inability to accommodate significant numbers of further returnees.41 
 Other examples of the emphasis on repatriation appear in reports issued by the 
State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.  In its reports to 
Congress on proposed refugee admissions for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the bureau 
noted that the Iraq War had “dramatically expanded the possibilities for refugee 
repatriation.”42  The same reports expressed a hope that Iraqis displaced throughout the 
world would soon return to Iraq.  However, there are subtle, but important, differences in 
the language used in each report.  The report for 2003 states, “it is expected that the 
majority of the 400,000 Iraqi refugees located throughout the Middle East and Europe 
will be able to return home in the near or mid term” (emphasis added).  The report for 
2004 uses “hoped” rather than “expected” and, unlike the previous report, also mentions 
that “the security situation will remain an important consideration in repatriation,” thus 
acknowledging that the situation in Iraq had deteriorated since the previous report.  
However, it contains no mention of new displacements.  Richard Green, the bureau’s 
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Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State did, however, mention this possibility in a 
statement before Congress, noting that part of the bureau’s responsibility was to “prevent 
further population displacements.”43  Green also added that “the conditions do not yet 
exist for large-scale organized refugee returns,”44 a further acknowledgement of the 
significant challenges the returning refugees and IDPs presented for the US and Iraq. 
 What emerges from a review of these documents and public statements is that 
despite official policy statements about providing humanitarian assistance, the US clearly 
viewed displacement mostly in political terms, and although it welcomed the return of 
refugees and IDPs, it wanted to ensure that they returned in a way that did not further 
destabilize Iraq.  Green’s comments notwithstanding, a notable absence from the 
documents and public statements from this period is any mention of new displacements, 
presumably because significant numbers of Iraqis did not become newly displaced until 
late 2004 and even then, the numbers were still less than the numbers of Iraqis who had 
returned.  New displacements had not yet become a cause of concern.  However, it is also 
undeniable that while the US gained politically from the fact that Iraqis were returning, 
new displacements could be interpreted as a sign that the US was losing control and that 
Iraqis lacked faith in its vision of a new Iraq.  Drawing attention to new displacements 
was not in its interest.  
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2006-2008:  MASS DISPLACEMENT AND THE “SURGE” 
 
 By mid-2006, the pattern of displacement had reversed: displaced Iraqis were no 
longer returning in significant numbers, and as many as 2,000 Iraqis were fleeing their 
country each day.1  Many of them were escaping the sectarian violence triggered by the 
bombing of the al-‘Askariyya mosque in February 2006.  Immediately after the bombing, 
Shi‘i militiamen led by Muqtada al-Sadr began killing Sunnis and attacking their 
mosques throughout Baghdad.  Sunnis responded in kind, resulting in a cycle of violence 
that strengthened radical groups as their co-sectarians began seeking their protection.2  
Although most of the violence was carried out by extremists, it escalated to the point 
where members of both sects were forced to take sides.3  If before this incident sectarian 
violence had been a by-product of the struggle for survival, rather than the result of open 
hostility between Sunnis and Shi‘is, the nature of the sectarian violence had changed, and 
its victims were now targeted simply for belonging to a particular sect.4 
 Based on their extensive fieldwork in Iraq during the summer of 2006, Ashraf al-
Khalidi and Victor Tanner have provided a detailed description of the various forms that 
the sectarian violence had taken.  They emphasize that extremist groups were responsible 
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for most of the violence and that they used it to consolidate their power and increase the 
areas under their control.  For example, they note that after the bombing of the Shi‘i 
shrine in Samarra, Sadr sought to increase his popularity by organizing retaliatory 
violence against Sunnis.  Both sides attempted to sow violence in mixed communities 
where intersectarian relations had remained good, and in the absence of a government 
able to provide protection and basic services, the radical groups successfully presented 
themselves as the protectors and providers.5  Because these radical groups sought to 
consolidate the territory under their control, Khalidi and Tanner refer to their campaigns 
of violence as “ethnic cleansing,” noting that the “result is that hard-line authorities . . . 
hold sway over cleansed territories.”6  
 Largely as a result of this sectarian violence, by September 2007, over 4 million 
Iraqis were displaced, 2.2 million internally and just under 2 million outside Iraq.7  
However, other factors contributed as well.  The local police were part of the problem, as 
they were either directly involved in the sectarian violence themselves or powerless to 
stop it.8  Fear of violence also played a big role, and it often stemmed from rumors, 
general intimidation in the form of threatening graffiti or direct intimidation appearing in 
letters addressed to individuals or even entire families and in notes or fliers attached to 
the doors of their homes or businesses.9 As a further cause of displacement, Khalidi and 
Tanner highlight what they refer to as “administrative displacement”: the manipulation of 
jobs and benefits by the Shi‘i government as a method of encouraging Sunnis to leave 
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and the harassment of Sunnis by the mostly Shi‘i police.10  Moreover, the lack of security 
and basic services, decline in standards of living, unemployment, unresolved property 
disputes and ongoing conflict between the US-led coalition and insurgent groups, all of 
which had contributed to the pre-2006 displacement of Iraqis, continued throughout 2006 
and 2007.11  The cumulative causation of all these factors resulted in mass 
displacement.12 
 It affected all sectors of the population.  Some of the first Iraqis to flee were 
former Ba‘thists, as even those with only remote connections to the party were victims of 
violence. Professionals, particularly doctors, lawyers and academics, also began to flee as 
they became the targets of kidnappings because of their relative wealth. 13  As the 
sectarian violence escalated, the victims of violence multiplied.  Khalidi and Tanner 
identify four categories of Iraqis who were displaced by sectarian violence: Sunnis from 
Shi‘i areas, Shi‘is from Sunni areas, Arabs from Kurdish areas, and minority groups from 
Sunni and Shi‘i areas.14  Ferris notes that because more men have died from the violence, 
more women are among the displaced, with women and children accounting for up to 80 
percent of displaced Iraqis.15  Emphasizing that displacement is a national problem, she 
indicates that all eighteen of Iraq’s governorates have registered IDPs.16 
 Toward the end of 2007, when the US sent more troops to Iraq as part of its 
military “surge,” former Sunni insurgents began cooperating with the US, and Muqtada 
al-Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army to stop engaging the coalition forces, violence 
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decreased, the rate of displacement slowed, and small numbers of refugees even began 
returning to Iraq.  However, the numbers of returnees were low, as just over 75,000, or 
less than 1 percent of displaced Iraqis, had returned by March 2008, and the total 
numbers of the displaced kept growing, with around 3 million Iraqis internally displaced 
at the end of 2008 and up to 2.4 million living as refugees.17 
 The displacement of Iraqis is mostly an urban phenomenon, as both IDPs and 
refugees tend to live in city apartments rather than in the tent compounds commonly 
associated with refugee populations.  Many of the Iraqis who first fled their country were 
wealthy Ba‘thists, creating the impression among citizens of host countries that most 
displaced Iraqis were wealthy.18  However, as the sectarian violence escalated throughout 
2006, and more Iraqis began fleeing for their lives, the population of displaced Iraqis 
became more demographically mixed, and the scale of the displacement began raising 
serious humanitarian concerns.   
In addition to the obvious trauma, sense of loss, despair and uncertainty that 
accompany displacement, many of Iraq’s refugees and IDPs struggle to meet their basic 
needs.  Most of the refugees are in Syria and Jordan, where they are not allowed to work, 
requiring them to live on savings or money sent from their families.19  As unemployment 
is one driver of displacement, the employment situation is no better for IDPs.  There have 
been some instances of refugee women turning to prostitution to support their families.20  
Both groups of displaced lack easy access to healthcare, some are experiencing 
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malnutrition, and their children’s education has been disrupted.21  Although Syria and 
Jordan allow Iraqi children to attend their schools, attendance among refugees is low 
because, among other reasons, they lack the necessary paperwork, cannot afford uniforms 
and supplies, and they are unprepared for the different curriculums they encounter.22 
 In addition to the humanitarian problems it creates, displacement also destabilizes 
Iraq and its neighbors and raises security concerns.  IDPs and refugees create new strains 
on public services, evidenced by water shortages and overcrowded schools in Syria and 
Jordan,23 which have resulted in resentment among the local populations.  They are also 
blamed for increases in rent and the prices of staple goods.24  Iraq suffers a brain drain 
resulting from the flight of significant numbers of its professional class, complicating the 
tasks of rebuilding and growing the economy.  By the summer of 2007, up to 40 percent 
of the professional class had left, including 50 percent of Iraq’s doctors, but also 
significant numbers of academics, teachers, and engineers, thus weakening Iraq’s 
healthcare and education systems and hindering its ability to  rebuild, grow the economy 
and create democratic institutions. 25   
Displacement is also altering Iraq’s sectarian geography, making its 
neighborhoods increasingly homogenized and raising troubling questions about Iraqis’ 
ability to form a national identity that supersedes more local identities.  This 
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homogenization is facilitated by militant groups in two general ways.  Shi‘i militants, for 
example, will not only force Sunni families from the areas under their control but will 
also help fellow Shi‘is who have been displaced from Sunni areas move into the homes 
vacated by Sunni families.26  These same militant groups will also provide the 
humanitarian assistant the government has failed to deliver.  Internal displacement thus 
creates opportunities for radical groups to increase their influence and solidifies sectarian 
identities, making it more difficult for Iraq to form a strong central government that has 
the trust and support of a majority of its people.27 
 Iraqi refugees tend to live in sectarian communities, and although to date they 
have not exported their country’s sectarian violence, sectarian identities are reinforced by 
the displacement, leading host countries to fear that increased sectarianism will result in 
sectarian violence at some point.28  Jordan and Syria are also concerned that the influx of 
Iraqi refugees will contribute to Islamic militancy.  In Jordan, Iraqis have moved into the 
poor neighborhood of Zarqa, known for its Islamist community’s opposition to the 
Jordanian monarchy and also as the hometown of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led al-
Qa‘ida in Iraq until his death in 2006.  According to Ferris, the Islamists of Zarqa have 
become more openly anti-American and anti-Shi‘i since 2003, and Jordan fears that the 
Sunni refugees from Iraq will find their message appealing.29  Syria has similar concerns, 
fearing that as Iraqis move in, the resulting resentment among the local population will 
increase support for political Islam and contribute to unrest.30  In addition, Syria, and 
Jordan even more so, fear that like the Palestinian refugees who have lived within their 
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borders for several decades, the displaced Iraqis will remain indefinitely.  Jordan has the 
highest ratio of refugees to local population of any country in the world, and its response 
to the influx of Iraqi refugees is inevitably colored by the fact that hosting large numbers 
of Palestinian refugees has created challenges to its national identity and at times resulted 
in serious threats to its security.  In an interview with Sassoon, a Jordanian official 
summarized his country’s concerns by stating that it is in danger of becoming “the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Refugees.”31 Jordan and Syria have both begun making it more 
difficult for Iraqis to enter and creating incentives for them to leave by, for example, 
introducing visa requirements that are difficult, if not impossible, for most Iraqis to 
meet.32 
 By the end of 2008, the displacement of Iraqis had thus become not only a 
humanitarian crisis for the displaced themselves, but also a national problem for Iraq and 
a regional concern for its neighbors.  It had also created major obstacles for the US in 
achieving its goals in Iraq.  If, as Rumsfeld had claimed at the end of 2004, the return of 
displaced Iraqis was a vote of confidence in the future of their country, the displacement 
situation at the end of 2008 represented a clear vote of no confidence.  As Ferris notes, 
“The presence of two million refugees in neighboring countries is a clear indication that 
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Gradual American Recognition of the Problem 
 
 As President Bush stated several times throughout the first few months of 2006, 
America’s goals in Iraq were to protect its fledgling democracy, increase its security and 
help with reconstruction.34  The displacement of Iraqis complicated all three of these 
goals, but if this fact was recognized by the Bush Administration, it was not 
acknowledged in any of its public statements throughout 2006.  As evidence that the US 
was succeeding in Iraq, the Bush Administration cited the constitutional referendum and 
two elections that had been held since 2003, the training of security forces, the growing 
size and strength of these forces, improvements in the performance of the Iraqi police, the 
tough political choices Iraqis had made in reforming their economy, and the fact that the 
economy was growing.35  The bombing of the al-‘Askariyya shrine was often cited as a 
failed attempt to incite sectarian violence, and Iraqis were praised for passing an 
important test by not turning to violence and allowing their country to descend into a civil 
war.  Recognized obstacles the US faced were the tense situation that resulted in the 
bombing and the continuing actions of “terrorists and Saddamists” who rejected freedom 
and democracy.36 
 It is understandable that the administration would choose to devote its public 
statements on Iraq to highlighting the progress it was making, especially after having to 
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acknowledge the intelligence failures regarding Saddam’s supposed possession of 
weapons of mass destruction.  Moreover, the displacement situation was still unfolding, 
and in the first few months after the Samarra bombing, it was not yet clear just how bad 
the situation would become.  However, the severity of the sectarian violence and the 
resulting displacement were becoming apparent by the middle of the year, and the 
administration should certainly have recognized that the situation in Iraq had taken a turn 
for the worse by October, when it was preparing its report to Congress on proposed 
refugee admissions for fiscal year 2007, but this proposal says nothing about new 
displacements.37 
 More than simply a proposal for refugee admissions, the report on refugees that 
the President submits to Congress each year provides a discussion of refugee policy, an 
update on the status of refugees throughout the world and details about how the US has 
assisted these refugees.  While each proposal emphasizes that the preferred solution for 
displacement is voluntary repatriation, it also acknowledges that in many instances, third-
country resettlement is the best option.  The proposal for 2007, states that resettlement “is 
an important part of the President’s Freedom Agenda,”38 President Bush’s stated 
commitment of promoting peace by ending tyranny and spreading freedom and 
democracy.  Despite the fact that Iraq was a key element in this agenda, its displaced 
people are not listed as a population of concern in the 2007 proposal.   
Instead, as in all the previous proposals submitted since the beginning of the Iraq 
War, the one for 2007 states that the conditions in Iraq “have expanded the possibilities 
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for refugee repatriation.”  Moreover, it adds that “with a constitutionally-elected 
government in place and a commitment by Iraq’s leaders to work toward improved 
security and enhance the delivery of essential services, it is hoped that significant 
numbers of Iraqi refugees will ultimately be able to return to Iraq.”  In general terms, the 
proposal does acknowledge that “some Iraqis in various locations” have been identified 
by UNHCR for resettlement, but the overall emphasis remains on voluntary 
repatriation.39  Given that by mid-summer 2006, several months before the 2007 proposal 
was submitted to Congress, it was clear that Iraq was potentially facing a new 
displacement crisis, this proposal was at best based on old information and at worst its 
authors willfully ignored the displacement problem.  It thus seems to support Sassoon’s 
claim that throughout 2006, the US policy toward the displacement of Iraqis was 
“simplistic: pretend it is not there and hopefully the problem will go away.”40  
 However, the growing displacement problem was not completely ignored by 
American officials throughout 2006.  In March, Congress had created the bipartisan Iraq 
Study Group to review the situation in Iraq and make recommendations for moving 
forward.  Co-chaired by former Sectary of State James Baker and former Congressman 
Lee Hamilton, the group consisted of former diplomats, academics, public policy 
specialists and a former Supreme Court justice.  Although his name does not appear on 
the final report, the group had also included Robert Gates before he resigned to serve as 
President Bush’s Secretary of Defense.  The group’s report, released in December 2006, 
recommended that the US place more emphasis on diplomacy in Iraq and the region and 
begin making preparations to reduce its military presence in Iraq.  Unlike the public 
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statements and policy documents released by the Bush Administration during 2006, the 
Iraq Study Group report acknowledged that displacement was a growing problem, stated 
that the US has a moral obligation to assist displaced Iraqis, and indicated that 
displacement was complicating the goal of stabilizing the country.41 
 In the same month, Senator Edward Kennedy published an op-ed in the 
Washington Post arguing that in 2007 the US must pay greater attention to the 
displacement problem.  To make his case, Kennedy listed statistics on the numbers of 
Iraqi refugees and IDPs, drew attention to the humanitarian concerns surrounding 
displaced Iraqis, and noted that displacement risked destabilizing the region.  He also 
criticized the Bush Administration for its failure to “recognize the breadth of the crisis 
and to adjust [its] policy to address the plain facts on the ground” and argued that because 
the US “bears heavy responsibility” for the flight of displaced Iraqis, it must not only 
acknowledge the displacement problem but also devote more resources to assisting the 
displaced.42 
 The Bush Administration began acknowledging the problem in early 2007.  In an 
address to the nation, President Bush backed away from his earlier assertion that the 
insurgents who bombed the Shi‘i shrine in Samarra had failed to incite sectarian violence 
and admitted that “their strategy worked.”43  As the purpose of this address was to 
announce that he was sending 20,000 more troops to Iraq, he also stated that the US must 
adopt a new strategy for responding to the sectarian violence.  In another notable 
departure from Bush’s earlier statements, the address said very little about freedom and 
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democracy and instead emphasized the goal of securing Iraq.  It did, however, remind 
Americans of the War in Iraq’s central role in “the global war on terror,” of al-Qa‘ida’s 
goals of “taking down Iraq’s democracy,” and of the ideological struggle between peace 
and moderation on one side and violent extremism on the other. 
 The following week, Ellen Sauerbrey, the Assistant Secretary for Population, 
Refugees, and Migration, attended a Senate hearing on Iraqi refugees, during which 
senators of both parties emphasized America’s moral obligation to assist displaced Iraqis, 
particularly ones who had worked with the US, and the problem of Iraq’s brain drain 
resulting from the fact that so many professionals had fled.44  In the Bush 
Administration’s first public acknowledgement of Iraq’s displacement problem, Secretary 
Sauerbrey assured them that “the administration shares your concern” and admitted that 
the “trend of repatriation had reversed itself.”  In order to assure senators that the 
administration was not ignoring the problem, she noted that in 2006, it had provided 
UNHCR with close to $8 million for assisting Iraqi refugees in Syria, Jordan and 
Lebanon and that it had also given money to NGOs working with displaced Iraqis.  She 
also indicated that the US was providing funding for UNHCR and various NGOs to help 
internally displaced Iraqis, and that the administration was working to resettle more Iraqis 
in the US, particularly those who had been targeted for working with the US.  However, 
unlike the senators, she did not concede that the US was morally obligated to help 
displaced Iraqis or that the displacement problem made it more difficult for the US to 
achieve its goals in Iraq. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 Nevertheless, Bush’s admission that the US strategy in Iraq was not working and 
Sauerbrey’s direct acknowledgement of the displacement problem were in stark contrast 
to the administration’s previous statements regarding the situation in Iraq.  These 
reversals are perhaps best understood as part of the administration’s effort to generate 
support for the military “surge.”  In order to justify the new approach, the administration 
first had to acknowledge the failures of the previous approach and then explain why the 
new approach would succeed where the other had failed.  Moreover, throughout 2006, the 
displacement problem had received considerable media attention, making it more 
difficult for the administration to ignore, and this was combined with pressure from 
Congress to recognize the problem and develop an adequate response to it.  A bit of 
candor from the administration regarding the war’s adverse effects on Iraqis was thus 
necessary for it to gain support for its new strategy.  Dodd notes that with the 
displacement problem, the administration was “caught in a bind: wanting to appear 
generous while not drawing too much attention to the issue.”45  In other words, as 
Sauerbrey’s remarks to the Senate demonstrate, the administration wanted to show that it 
was responding to the problem, without necessarily acknowledging its severity or directly 
stating that it was creating serious obstacles for the US as it struggled to achieve its goals 
in Iraq. 
 In April 2007, the administration released its quarterly report on the situation in 
Iraq, which reiterated America’s commitment to “helping the Iraqi people build a 
constitutional, representative government” and stated that the “ultimate goal is an Iraq 
that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, with institutions capable of 
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providing just governance and security for all Iraqis.”46  Without mentioning 
displacement’s impact on this goal, the report did acknowledge the problem and again 
noted that the US was assisting displaced Iraqis by funding UNHCR and various NGOs.  
After visiting Syria and Jordan in March and becoming alarmed by the number of 
displaced Iraqi children who were not attending school, Sauerbrey indirectly linked the 
displacement problem with America’s progress in Iraq by noting that the disruption in the 
children’s education was “a looming disaster for Iraq.”47  She announced that in order to 
help these children continue their education, the US was contributing $30 million to 
UNHCR and UNICEF’s Joint Appeal to Provide Educational Opportunities for Iraqi 
Children in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt.48  However, by acknowledging the 
problem and announcing the funding, she did not echo the Senators’ assertions that the 
US had a moral obligation to help displaced Iraqis, and instead cast the displacement 
problem as an international problem, calling for “resources from a broad range of 
donors.”49 
 While the administration was publicizing its efforts to fund UNHCR and other 
organizations, it was coming under increasing criticism for not allowing more Iraqi 
refugees to resettle in the US.  In his op-ed, Senator Kennedy had lamented the fact that 
the US had accepted only 202 Iraqi refugees in 2006.50  This was due, in part, to what 
Berman has called the “securitization” of asylum seekers: viewing displaced Iraqis as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Section 1227 Report on Iraq, Apr. 6, 2007. 
47 Sauerbrey, “Sectarian Violence and the Refugee Crisis in Iraq,” Remarks to the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom Hearing, Sept. 19, 2007. 
48 Sauerbrey, “U.S. Helps Iraqi Refugee Children Return to School,” Remarks Upon the 
Announcement of $30 million Contribution to UNHCR/UNICEF Joint Appeal, Amman, Jordan, Aug. 28, 
2007. 
49 Ibid.	  
50 Kennedy, A21. 
38	  
	  
potential sources of violence rather than as victims of it.51  However, the low acceptance 
numbers were also a result of the new security rules implemented since September 2011 
that required more intensive scrutiny of asylum seekers.  Under these rules, several 
months could pass between the time a refugee was recommended for resettlement and the 
time his or her file was finally processed.  US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker 
criticized this process for taking too long and urged the administration to find ways of 
expediting it.52  One provision of these rules is that an individual who has provided 
material support to terrorists cannot be recognized as a refugee.  However, material 
support was defined so broadly that this provision disqualified Iraqis who had paid 
ransoms to save their family members who had been kidnapped.    In an op-ed criticizing 
this broad interpretation, Kirk Johnson, the USAID coordinator of reconstruction in 
Falluja, provided the example of a woman who had worked for the CPA and had thus 
become a target of violence but was ineligible for asylum in the US because she and her 
husband had paid terrorists a ransom to secure the release of their kidnapped son.53  
Another problem that Crocker highlighted was that Iraqis had to leave the country in 
order to register for resettlement, even those who had worked for the US, and as Jordan 
and Syria made it more difficult for Iraqis to enter, it was impossible for many to register 
for asylum.54 
 In response to these various criticisms, the Bush Administration began taking 
steps to allow more Iraqis to resettle in the US.  It announced plans to resettle 12,000 in 
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2007 and introduced special immigrant visas (SIVs) to make it easier for Iraqis who had 
worked with the US to resettle.55  By November 2007, 2,300 Iraqis had been admitted 
with SIVs.  The US had also expanded the US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) to 
process more asylum applications in Jordan, Egypt Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Lebanon, 
and although only around 1,600 had been resettled in the US, with the expansion of 
USRAP and the accelerated pace of asylum issues, the US expected to meet its goal of 
resettling 12,000 Iraqi refugees during the next year.56 
 More evidence of America’s increased efforts to assist displaced Iraqis appears in 
the Bush Administration’s report on proposed refugee admissions for fiscal year 2008.  
Unlike the report from the previous year, this report directly acknowledges that sectarian 
violence had “led to wide-scale displacement within and from Iraq.”  While it emphasizes 
that “the primary goal continues to be to support efforts to create conditions that will 
allow Iraqis to return home,” it also acknowledges that “the current situation is limiting 
repatriation.”57 
 In 2007, the Bush Administration was much more responsive to Iraq’s 
displacement problem than it had been since the beginning of the conflict in Iraq.  Not 
only did it acknowledge that insurgents had succeeded in provoking sectarian violence 
and that this violence had resulted in a reversal of the repatriations that had characterized 
the displacement situation in the first few years of the conflict, but it had also taken 
significant measures to provide assistance for displaced Iraqis and begin resettling more 
Iraqis in the US.  However, with the small exception of Secretary Sauerbrey’s statement 
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that the disruption in the education of Iraqi children created problems for Iraq’s future, 
the administration had not publicly recognized that the displacement of Iraqis created 
complications for achieving its goals in Iraq.  This did not change in 2008. 
 In 2008, the first quarterly report on the situation in Iraq again emphasized 
America’s commitment to protecting and strengthening Iraq’s democracy.  The report 
also noted that security in Iraqi had improved significantly since the beginning of the 
“surge.”  Its assessment of the displacement problem indicated that Iraqis were returning 
from Syria, but acknowledged that most were returning because their visas had expired or 
they could no longer afford to live in Syria, not because of security improvements in 
Iraq.58  It thus indirectly stated that Iraqis were still not confident in their country’s 
future. 
 Throughout 2008, the US increased its efforts in assisting displaced Iraqis.  In 
January, President Bush signed the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, which contains several 
provisions for facilitating the process through which Iraqis can apply for resettlement, 
including the creation of in-country processing facilities and new categories of Iraqis who 
are eligible for direct access to USRAP.59  In-country processing had begun by March, 
and this, combined with the expansion of USRAP, enabled the US to surpass its goal of 
admitting 12,000 Iraqi refugees by September.60 
 Moreover, statements from administration officials contained more references to 
America’s obligation toward displaced Iraqis, particularly ones who had worked for or 
assisted the US.  For example, during a Congressional hearing on the US response to the 
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displacement of Iraqis, Lawrence Butler, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the State 
Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, remarked, “We have an obligation to the 
vulnerable populations that need to leave, that want to leave.”61  James Foley, the State 
Department’s Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues, echoed his statement by 
noting that “we have special obligations to Iraqis who have been employed by the U.S. or 
have been closely associated with U.S. efforts in Iraq, who are targeted and under threat 
for their work on our behalf.”62  However, Foley was also careful to contextualize this 
obligation as “only part of our wider obligations to create the conditions inside Iraq that 
will permit some 2 million Iraqi refugees to return home.”63  Fulfilling these obligations 
was also understood as essential for helping to improve America’s image in the Middle 
East.64 
Despite the administration’s emphasis on the importance of creating the necessary 
conditions for Iraqis to return home, it also acknowledged that improved security 
conditions had not yet resulted in a significant pattern of return,65 that the earlier reported 
returns from Syria had stopped, and that by the middle of 2008, the Iraqis leaving for 
Syria outnumbered those who had returned.66  The administration even acknowledged 
that the displacement of Iraqis had resulted in “the largest movement of people in the 
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Middle East since 1948,” when the creation of Israel led to the displacement of hundreds 
of thousands of Palestinians.67 
 By the end of President Bush’s second term, his administration had thus become 
much more candid about the scale of Iraq’s displacement problem and had taken 
significant steps toward assisting displaced Iraqis.  It had also publicly recognized that 
the US had an obligation to assist these Iraqis, particularly the ones whose lives were 
endangered because they had worked with the US.  Various documents and public 
statements from the administration indicate that it understood the displacement problem 
primarily as a humanitarian concern.  However, there seems to be no public 
acknowledgement that the displacement of Iraqis created obstacles for its stated goals of 
securing and rebuilding Iraq and protecting its young democracy.  The administration 
must have recognized that with IDPs and refugees contributing to instability within Iraq 
and throughout the region, with the absence of significant numbers of the professional 
class necessary for rebuilding Iraq, and with the failure of significant numbers of Iraqis to 
return and thus demonstrate their confidence in their country’s future, it would be very 
difficult to achieve its goals in Iraq, but there is no direct evidence that this was the case.   
Assuming that the administration did understand that the displacement of millions 
of Iraqis complicated its goals in Iraq, it must also have understood that public 
acknowledgement of this fact could have been politically damaging, as it would have 
required admitting that despite the security gains, it was not succeeding in Iraq and that 
achieving success was much more complicated than it had realized.  Speaking of 
displacement in humanitarian terms was a way of demonstrating that the US was meeting 
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its obligation toward displaced Iraqis, but in the administration’s narrative about its 
success in Iraq, there was no place for an acknowledgement of the wider implications of 






2009-PRESENT:  IRAQIS ARE NOT RETURNING 
 
 By the time of President Obama’s inauguration in January 2009, the rate of 
displacement had significantly decreased.  Whereas people had been fleeing their homes 
at a rate of 90,000 per month in January 2007, by May 2008, the number had dropped to 
under 10,000.  However, the decreased rate of new displacements was not matched by a 
marked increase in the number of returns.  One indication of this is that of the 20,000 
doctors who had fled Iraq since 2003, only 1,000 had returned.1  As a result, the total 
number of displaced Iraqis had not decreased,2 a clear indication that many Iraqis were 
still very apprehensive about their country’s future. 
 The situation in Iraq had undeniably improved since the beginning of the mass 
displacement in 2006.  The sectarian violence triggered by the bombing of the al-
‘Askariyya mosque had mostly abated, and the country was experiencing notable security 
gains.  Civilian casualties were under 500 a month, a marked improvement from mid-
2006, when the rate was almost 4,000 a month.3  The number of American troop fatalities 
in January 2009 was 15, whereas the average had been around 100 a month from 2004 to 
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2007.4  Moreover, there was also good reason to assume that the quality of life for Iraqis 
had improved as well.  Unemployment had decreased slightly, the country had exceeded 
its goals for power generation, Internet and phone subscriptions were increasing each 
month, Iraq’s economy was growing and foreign investment had increased tenfold since 
2007.5  Iraq had also made significant steps toward establishing the rule of law, as it had 
well over 1,000 trained judges by the beginning of 2009, up from zero in 2003.6 
 However, despite these very positive signs that Iraq was becoming safer, more 
stable and prosperous and thus slightly more bearable to live in, there were still several 
indicators that it had a long way to go before becoming “the peaceful, united, stable, 
democratic and secure Iraq” envisioned by the US.7  Levels of violence were still high; 
jobs were still hard to find; and the government had still not resolved some of the major 
political issues preventing Iraq from moving forward, such as reaching an agreement on 
oil sharing, passing an election law, reversing de-Ba‘thification, disbanding militias and 
amending the constitution to address Sunni concerns.8 
As a result, Iraqis were not yet convinced that the situation was improving.  Thirty-six 
percent of those polled in February 2008 believed the security situation had improved 
within the last six months while 37 percent believed it had stayed the same.  Twenty-six 
percent said it had worsened.  Similarly, while 36 percent replied that the situation in Iraq 
was “quite good,” the same number indicated that it was “quite bad,” and the number 
who believed it was “very bad” (20 percent) was far greater than the number who said it 
was “very good” (7 percent).  When broken down by sect, the responses indicate that 
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Sunnis were far less satisfied with the current state of their country than Shi‘is and Kurds. 
Fifty-two percent of Shi‘is and 33 percent of Kurds said the situation was “quite good,” 
but only 14 percent of Sunnis felt this way, whereas 43 percent believed the situation was 
“very bad.”  However, their opinion had improved since the previous poll in October 
2007, when 60 percent of Sunnis said the situation was “very bad.”9  Improvements were 
thus experienced unevenly among the population, raising ominous questions about the 
relations among Iraq’s different sects and whether it was on the right track toward 
creating a democracy capable of accommodating these different sects. 
 As a result, most displaced Iraqis were not yet convinced that it was better for 
them to return.  Although continuing violence is by far the most significant obstacle 
preventing displaced Iraqis from returning, in assessing the displacement situation, it is 
important to remember that decisions on whether to return are based on several factors.10  
Uncertainty regarding housing and employment had also discouraged Iraqis from 
returning, and only 14 percent of those who had returned cited increased security as their 
reason.  Far more indicated that they were running out of money or that their visas had 
expired.11  Other factors include access to healthcare, basic services and quality 
education, all of which were still lacking in Iraq at the beginning of 2009.12 
 A year later the displacement situation was relatively unchanged, with the total 
numbers of displaced remaining about the same, as the small numbers of returnees were 
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balanced by the small numbers of newly displaced.13  Violence had decreased further, 
and a small majority of Iraqis believed the situation in their country was better than it had 
been the year before.  These opinions still varied among the sects, as most Shi‘is and 
Kurds believed conditions were either “very” or “quite” good, and a small majority of 
Sunnis felt they were either “very” or “quite” bad.14  
Overall, the situation in Iraq continues to move in a positive direction, as the latest 
figures show the violence continuing to drop and the economy continuing to grow.15  
However, most Iraqis remain skeptical, as a majority of the population believes the 
country is heading in the wrong direction and that its economic condition is bad.  They do 
seem to have faith in the political process, as 61 percent approve of their government, and 
most Iraqis agree that the security situation has improved over the last year.16  Displaced 
Iraqis seem more skeptical than those who were not forced to flee.  Of the roughly 2 
million who have fled since 2003, only 100,000 have returned, and most cannot earn 
enough to support their families and regret going back.17 
 The displacement of Iraqis thus appears in danger of becoming a protracted 
situation, and it risks undermining the very real gains that Iraq has experienced over the 
past few years.  Protracted displacement can lead to desperation and increased 
sectarianism and makes the messages of extremists more appealing.  It can also add to the 
resentment of the local population, either Iraqis who can no longer bear the burden of 
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hosting IDPs or Syrians or Jordanians who perceive refugees as the source of their 
financial problems.  Economic and political development are also complicated by 
displacement as significant numbers of the professional class necessary for rebuilding 
remain outside Iraq.18  It is thus in the interest of the US not only to respond to the 
displacement of Iraqis as a humanitarian concern, but also to recognize that this 
displacement complicates the goals it hopes to achieve as it completes its military 




Response of the Obama Administration 
 
 Whereas it would have been politically damaging for the Bush Administration to 
have acknowledged publicly the extent of the displacement problem in Iraq, the Obama 
Administration was not under the same constraints in early 2009.  Obama had been a 
vocal critic of the war since the build up to the invasion in 2003, and when he became 
president, he had inherited the situation in Iraq that Bush had largely created.  Public 
statements regarding the difficulties that displacement created for the US would thus not 
have been admissions of his own failings, but frank assessments of his predecessor’s 
shortcomings.  However, these difficulties remain either unacknowledged or simply 
misunderstood.  The Obama Administration has continued and expanded the Bush 
Administration’s policies toward displaced Iraqis and continues to approach the 
displacement problem strictly as a matter of humanitarian concern. 
 The Obama Administration does seem to have different goals in Iraq than the 
Bush Administration.  Although public statements from administration officials continue 
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to mention the importance of protecting Iraq’s democracy, the word “democracy” is 
conspicuously absent from most official policy statements.  Under the Bush 
Administration, every quarterly report on the situation in Iraq stated that the ultimate goal 
of the US was to ensure that Iraq became a peaceful, united, secure and stable democracy.  
This has not been listed as a goal since Obama took office.19  The administration seems to 
have recognized that in order to achieve some measure of success in Iraq and still follow 
the timetable for troop withdrawals, the US must scale back its goals and make them 
more realistic.  Its stated goals are to promote security, stability and prosperity in Iraq and 
help it emerge as a force for stability and moderation in the region.20 It does not seem to 
have considered the impact that continued displacement can have on these goals. 
 In an op-ed published during his presidential campaign, Obama pledged to 
“commit $2 billion to a new international effort to support Iraq’s refugees,”21 thus 
demonstrating his intention to provide humanitarian support for displaced Iraqis, and 
once in office, he acted upon this intention.  By the end of March 2009, the State 
Department had announced around $150 million in new contributions to help displaced 
Iraqis, and this money was allocated for emergency relief supplies, water systems and 
mental health services for IDPs, and school reconstruction and mobile health units for 
Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan.22  The administration has repeatedly voiced its 
commitment to providing displaced Iraqis with humanitarian assistance.23 
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 The Obama Administration has also coordinated with UNHCR and the Iraqi 
government to help prepare for the return of refugees and IDPs and expanded the 
resettlement programs begun under the Bush Administration.24  While it acknowledges 
that the conditions are not yet in place for the large-scale return of refugees and IDPs, the 
Obama Administration emphasizes that “the long term U.S. strategy for Iraq’s displaced 
it to help Iraq develop the capacity to reintegrate returning Iraqis into stable 
neighborhoods.”25 
 In short, there are no fundamental differences between the Obama 
Administration’s response to the displacement of Iraqis and the policies of the last few 
years of the Bush Administration.  The US has clearly moved away from the 
“securitization of asylum seekers” and adopted policies that treat displaced Iraqis as the 
victims of violence rather than potential perpetrators of it.26  The emphasis on the 
humanitarian concerns surrounding displaced Iraqis is thus a welcome change from the 
Bush’s Administration’s response throughout 2006.  However, by responding to 
displacement strictly as a humanitarian concern, the US neglects other dimensions of the 
problem that have important implications for Iraq’s future. 
 In her discussion of why “nonhumanitarian actors” should pay attention to the 
displaced, Ferris stresses the importance of understanding the impact of displacement on 
Iraq’s security, politics and economy.  Despite the widespread concern that Iraqi refugees 
would export their country’s sectarian violence, Reinoud Leenders has demonstrated that 
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the real security threats caused by displacement occur within Iraq.  As neighborhoods 
have become more homogenized as a result of displacement, radical groups have 
increased the territory under their control and have thus become greater threats to the 
security and stability of the country.27  In a more general sense, Iraq’s changed sectarian 
geography also reinforces sectarian identities and risks entrenching sectarian politics.28  
Many homes have been occupied illegally, creating uncertainty and the potential for 
increased instability if their owners return and attempt to reclaim them.29   
Political and economic development suffer from the fact that large numbers of 
Iraqi professionals remain outside the country.  Their displacement has been described as 
a “flight of moderation” by Samir Shankir Sumayda’i, Iraq’s ambassador to the US, 
because of their perceived potential to act as a moderating force in Iraqi politics.30  The 
longer they remain outside the country, the more detached they become from daily life 
inside Iraq and the more difficult it will be for them to integrate into the emerging post-
Saddam Iraqi society.31  The absence of significant numbers of the professional class also 
deprives Iraq of human capital and the expertise necessary for reconstruction and 
economic development.32     
 The US is clearly aware that Iraq remains insecure, that its economy remains 
underdeveloped, that reconstruction is proceeding slowly and that its political system 
would benefit from a bit of moderation.  It has also stated several times that its long-term 
goal for the displacement problem is to create the conditions necessary for displaced 
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Iraqis to return voluntarily. However, the fact that it has responded to displacement as a 
purely humanitarian concern suggests either that it does not understand, or that is it 
unwilling to acknowledge, the relationship between displacement and the various other 








 Three key points have emerged from this analysis of the US response to the 
displacement of Iraqis.  The first is that, unsurprisingly, this response is determined 
largely by politics.  In the first several months after Saddam Hussein was overthrown, 
voluntary repatriations far outnumbered new displacements, a fact to which the US drew 
attention because it enabled it to claim not only that it had been right to invade Iraq and 
that it was succeeding in its goal of building a democratic Iraq but also that by returning, 
Iraqis were demonstrating that they shared the American vision for a new Iraq and that 
they believed America would succeed.  However, if returning Iraqis were casting votes of 
confidence in their country’s future, fleeing ones were casting votes of no-confidence, so 
when the trend of repatriations began to reverse in late 2005/early 2006, rather than 
drawing attention to this fact, the US continued to insist that conditions in Iraq were such 
that repatriation was possible and that it expected most displaced Iraqis would voluntarily 
return.  This changed only when it became more politically damaging to ignore the 
problem than to acknowledge it. 
 The second point is that security concerns have also played a key role in the US 
response to the displacement problem.  Fairly early on, the US recognized that it had a 
special obligation to protect displaced Iraqis who had worked with or helped the US in 
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some way and had thus become targets of violence.  The obvious solution was to resettle 
them and their families in the US, and this eventually happened for many Iraqis, although 
the process initially moved very slowly.  This was due mostly to the new immigration 
rules implemented after the 9/11 terrorist attacks that either disqualified Iraqis from 
receiving asylum or resulted in a lengthy review process lasting several months.  The 
process was also hampered by the fact that until 2008, security procedures prevented 
Iraqis from applying for resettlement at the US embassy in Iraq, requiring them to leave 
the country to apply for resettlement, even if they had been employed by the US. 
 It is understandable that national security would be an important factor when 
considering Iraqis for resettlement, but this approach, which treated displaced Iraqis as 
potential terrorists rather than as victims of violence, resulted in the “securitization” of 
the displacement problem and a rather inhuman treatment of refugees and IDPs.1  
Moreover, although the US has expressed concern that Iraqi refugees will export their 
country’s sectarian violence, it does not seem to have understood that the real security 
threat from displacement is in Iraq itself. 
 The third point to emerge from this study is that the US has responded to 
displacement as a purely humanitarian problem.  While the emphasis on providing 
humanitarian relief is obviously a welcome change from the Bush Administration’s initial 
refusal to acknowledge the problem at all, it has produced a one-dimensional response to 
a multidimensional problem.  The US is clearly aware that Iraq remains unstable, that its 
politics are dysfunctional and that it lacks the necessary human capital to grow its 
economy and complete reconstruction projects.  However, although each of these 
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problems is closely related to displacement, the US does not seem to have accepted this 
fact.  
 This is not to deny the complexity of the displacement problem, as it is not 
entirely clear what more the US could do.  However, a start would be an open 
acknowledgement of the scale of the problem.  The Rand Corporation’s report for the 
Department of Defense recognizes that while displacement is primarily a humanitarian 
concern, it has other dimensions as well.  It thus emphasizes that the US “must recognize 
the displacement crisis for what it is: a long-term development challenge for Iraq and the 
region.”2  Recognizing this fact would also involve an open acknowledgement that the 
displacement of Iraqis makes it difficult for the US to achieve its goals in Iraq, but this is 
unlikely because it would be so politically damaging.   
The Bush Administration was able to contain some of the political fallout from 
Iraq’s displacement problem by acknowledging it and treating it as a humanitarian issue.  
President Obama had the opportunity to blame the displacement problem on his 
predecessor, recognize the full scale of the problem and then present himself as cleaning 
up his predecessor’s mess.  Whether he had already pointed out too many of Bush’s 
messes or if he simply did not grasp the multiple dimensions of the problem, he chose to 
continue the policies implemented in the last few years of the Bush presidency. Now, as 
he must devote his attention to a wide range of domestic problems, a continuing war in 
Afghanistan, an intervention in Libya, and the widespread general unrest in the Middle 
East, while also beginning his reelection campaign, President Obama is not in a position 
to highlight any complications in Iraq that might deepen American involvement there as 
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the date for the final withdrawal quickly approaches.  It thus seems that for the 
foreseeable future, the US will continue treating the displacement problem as a strictly 
humanitarian problem.  It will continue providing displaced Iraqis with much needed 
humanitarian assistance, but it will also fail to grasp the multiple dimensions of the 
displacement problem and miss opportunities to develop a comprehensive response that 
could both help the US achieve its goals in Iraq and add to the likelihood that Iraq will 
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